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NOTES 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMATION 
Matthew L. VanDyke* 
The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disabilities Insurance (OASDI) Program, 
commonly referred to as the Social Security Program (hereinafter “the 
Program”), is the largest income maintenance program in the United States, 
and has guaranteed an income for retirees, their survivors, and people with 
disabilities for over 80 years.1 In 2017 alone, roughly 61 million people 
received monthly benefits2 averaging $1,342 per person,3 with total 
expenditures exceeding $922 billion.4 Due to this substantial disbursement 
of benefits, the Program has a major impact on the U.S. economy, and it is 
particularly responsible for a reduction in the poverty rate and an increase in 
economic output.5 However, the Program is currently on a collision course 
with an economic reality: Its expenditures have begun to exceed its income, 
and if the Program maintains its current benefit and tax rates, it is on a fiscally 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Third-year law student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law; graduating May, 2018. 
1 David Hosansky, Social Security: Is the Program Running Out of Money?, 26 CQ Researcher 481 
(June 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/cqr20160603C.pdf. 
2 THE 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BD. OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS 
INS. AND FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS at 2 (2017) [hereinafter TRUSTEES REPORT]. The Board of 
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
(also known as the Social Security Trustees) oversees the financial operations of the two Trust Funds and 
issues an annual report that presents the financial status of the Funds. 
3 Penelope Wang, What’s The Maximum Social Security Benefit in 2017?, TIME (Feb. 6, 2017), 
http://time.com/money/4644332/maximum-social-security-benefit-2017/. 
4 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
5 See generally Gary Koenig & Al Myles, Social Security’s Impact on the National Economy, 
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (2014). 
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unsustainable path.6 Since 2010, the Program has been paying more in 
benefits and expenses than it has collected in taxes and other non-interest 
income, a trend that is expected to continually worsen.7 The 2017 Social 
Security Trustees Report (“Trustees Report”) projects that by 2035, the two 
trust funds that finance the Program—the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
(OASI) Trust Fund, and the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund—will be 
completely depleted and therefore insolvent.8 
In order to resolve the projected financial shortfall of the Program, 
immediate reform is necessary. However, due to the heated political climate 
in the United States, the types of reform that have been proposed to solve this 
fast-approaching economic crisis exist on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum. Thus, reform is a hot topic issue that is often debated but has yet 
to be resolved.9 Indeed, an array of economic consequences will stem from 
reform, and dependent upon socioeconomic class and the reform measure(s) 
implemented, citizens’ benefits will be affected. Therefore, when 
determining how to best resolve the Program’s impending financial shortfall, 
lawmakers must carefully consider the economic impact that specific reform 
measures would have on both individual citizens and the U.S. economy as a 
whole. 
This Note analyzes the economic impact of Social Security reform at 
both the individual (micro) and national (macro) level. In doing so, it weighs 
the positive and negative economic effects of two major Social Security 
reform policies: (1) increasing funding by raising or eliminating the payroll 
tax cap, and (2) cutting benefits by increasing the retirement age. Part I of 
this Note provides a brief history of the Program and the issues that gave rise 
to its projected financial shortfall. Parts II and III, respectively, discuss the 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 3. 
9 The last time the Program experienced a full-scale reform was in 1983. The reform stemmed from 
President Ronald Regan’s creation of the National Commission on Social Security Reform, which was 
created to determine how to resolve the Program’s then-projected financial shortfall. The Commission 
issued a report in January 1983, which became the basis for the 1983 Social Security Amendments. The 
Amendments included both reducing benefits and raising taxes. The reform measures were a success, as 
they resolved the Program’s projected financial shortfall. Report of the National Commission of Social 
Security Reform, Social Security Administration, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/gspan.html 
(accessed on Mar. 3, 2017). See also Social Security Reform Center, History of Social Security, http:// 
www.socialsecurityreform.org/history/index.cfm. 
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individual economic consequences of increasing funds by raising or 
eliminating the payroll tax cap, and the economic consequences of cutting 
benefits by raising the retirement age. Part IV provides an outlook of the 
Program’s impact on the U.S. economy. Finally, Part V briefly suggests a 
number of solutions that would fix the projected economic shortfall and 
therefore lead to the continued solvency of the Program. 
While the Program is comprised of two separate entities—the OASI 
Program and the DI Program—the operations of the Program are shown on 
a combined basis as the OASDI Program.10 Consistent with the Trustees 
Report, this Note is combines the two Programs as the OASDI Program. 
However, this Note places a greater emphasis on the larger of the two 
Programs—the OASI Program. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
A. History 
The Program was created on August 14, 1935, when the Social Security 
Act was signed into law by Franklin D. Roosevelt.11 Following the onset of 
the Great Depression, poverty among the elderly grew dramatically, and at 
the Depression’s height, an estimated one-half of the elderly lacked enough 
income to be self-supporting.12 The Program was created to provide 
economic security through a continuing source of income for retired 
workers.13 At its inception, the Program provided single-lump sum payments, 
financed by payroll taxes, to retired workers aged 65 and older.14 
When the Program was enacted, President Roosevelt noted that it was 
simply a starting point, and that future reform would be necessary.15 The 
Program underwent reform in 1939 by expanding benefits to include a 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
11 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html [hereinafter HISTORICAL BACKGROUND] (last accessed 
Mar. 2018). 
12 Id. See also MARTHA A. MCSTEEN, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FIFTY YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 37 
(1985), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n8/v48n8p36.pdf. 
13 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 11. 
14 Id. 
15 MCSTEEN, supra note 12, at 38 (Quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt: “This law, too, 
represents a cornerstone in a structure which is being built but is by no means complete.”). 
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worker’s spouse and children, and by providing “survivors benefits paid to 
the family in the event of the premature death of a covered worker.”16 
Expanding from a retirement program solely for workers, into a family-based 
economic security program,17 the 1939 Amendments established the Old Age 
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund.18 It again underwent reform in 
1956 to create the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, which provides 
benefits to disabled persons who are unable to work due to long-term 
disability.19 Today, the OASI Program and DI Program constitute what is 
commonly referred to as the OASDI Program, or Social Security Program. 
B. Problems with the Program 
Since the Program’s inception, both life expectancy and the number of 
retirees eligible to receive benefits has drastically increased—a trend that is 
expected to continue.20 In 2017, the average life expectancy in the United 
States for males and females combined who reached age 65 was 85.45 
years.21 This means that on average, today’s elderly live about 21 years post-
retirement,22 which is a substantial increase compared to 1940, when the 
Program began making regular monthly payments.23 At that time, the average 
post-retirement life expectancy for men and women combined was a mere 14 
years.24 
Furthermore, as the nation’s population ages, the number of retirees 
collecting benefits is rising faster than the number of workers paying taxes 
to support the Program.25 This is due to the retirement of the baby-boom 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Id. 
17 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 11. 
18 MCSTEEN, supra note 12, at 38. 
19 Id. 
20 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
21 Id. at 96; see also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., CALCULATORS: LIFE EXPECTANCY, https://www.ssa.gov/ 
planners/lifeexpectancy.html (last accessed Mar. 2018). 
22 Hosansky, supra note 1, at 483; see also TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. This assumes 
that a person retires at age sixty-five. 
23 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., LIFE EXPECTANCY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/history/ 
lifeexpect.html (last accessed Mar. 2018). 
24 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. 
25 See generally id. at 23. 
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generation coupled with lower birth rates.26 As a result, the 2017 Trustees 
Report projects that the ratio of 2.8 workers paying taxes to each beneficiary 
will decline to 2.1 workers to 1 beneficiary in 2036.27 
In 2016, there were roughly 48 million Americans over the age of 65, 
which accounted for roughly 15.2% of the U.S. population.28 This number is 
expected to increase to 79 million by 2035,29 and by 2060, it is projected that 
roughly 98 million Americans will be over the age of 65, which is more than 
double what currently exists.30 
 
 31 
Due to the increase in life expectancy and growth of the elderly 
population, the Program’s costs have exceeded its non-interest income, and 
this trend is expected to worsen for at least the next 75 years.32 By 2022, costs 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Id. See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB., NO. 13-11785, FAST FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL 
SECURITY, 2017, at 36 (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter FAST FACTS & FIGURES]. 
27 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 26; see also TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 132–
34. 
28 Hosansky, supra note 1, at 483. 
29 Id. 
30 Mark Mather, Linda A. Jacobsen & Kelvin M. Pollard, Population Bulletin, 70 POPULATION 
REFERENCE BUREAU 1, 3 (2015), http://www.prb.org/pdf16/aging-us-population-bulletin.pdf. 
31 Id. 
32 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 31. 
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are projected to exceed total income, and the Trust Funds’ $2.8 trillion 
surplus will decline. The DI Trust Fund is projected to become depleted in 
2028, and the OASI Trust Fund projected to become depleted in 2035, at 
which point the Program will be insolvent.33 While income will continue to 
flow into the Trust Funds, it will only be sufficient to pay 77% of scheduled 
benefits.34 Specifically, the OASI Trust Fund is projected to only be able to 
pay 75% of its scheduled benefits.35 
In sum, the Program cannot continue to finance lengthier retirements for 
a rising percentage of the population. Therefore, reform must occur in order 
to resolve the impending financial insolvency of the Program’s Trust Funds. 
If reform measures are not implemented until insolvency occurs, it is 
projected that restoring balance would require a 17% reduction in scheduled 
benefits, an increase of the payroll tax from 12.4% to 15.16%, or some 
combination of both.36 
II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE PAYROLL 
TAX CAP 
A. Overview of the Payroll Tax Cap 
The Program is financed by three main sources: payroll taxes, federal 
income taxes on benefits, and interest accrued on the Trust Funds’ balance.37 
The largest of these three revenue generators is the payroll tax, which applies 
a 6.2% tax of a worker’s earnings up to a taxable maximum, known as the 
“payroll tax cap.”38 The employee’s employer is also subjected to a 6.2% tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
34 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 37. 
35 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
36 Id. at 6. 
37 The revenue generated from the payroll tax is divided between the Trust Funds, with the 
substantial majority of revenue being allocated to the OASI Trust Fund. Id. at 8. In 2016, 10.03% of 
revenue generated from the payroll tax was allocated to the OASI trust fund, whereas only 2.37% was 
allocated to the DI Trust Fund. Id. 
38 The 2018 payroll tax cap is $128,400.00. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2018 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES 
(2018), https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2018.pdf. The “payroll tax cap” is technically 
called the “contribution and benefit base,” due to the fact that it applies the same annual limit to earnings 
when used in benefit computation. See CONTRIBUTION AND BENEFIT BASE, SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION (2017), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html. Applying the cap to both contributions 
and benefits ensures that benefits bear some relationship to contributions and align with the progressive 
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that mirrors the employee’s earnings up to the taxable maximum for a 
combined tax rate of 12.4%.39 Due to the projected financial shortfall, many 
policymakers have proposed increasing or eliminating the payroll tax cap to 
help increase revenue to restore the Trust Funds’ financial balance.40 
B. Advantages of Increasing or Eliminating the Payroll Tax Cap 
Raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap would expand retirement 
security for millions of workers without imposing an economic burden on 
impoverished people who are most in need of the Program’s benefits.41 
Moreover, it would result in high-income earners paying a tax rate equal or 
closer to what middle and lower-class citizens currently pay, thus making the 
Program more progressive.42 
The average number of workers above the cap in a given year has risen 
from 3% at the Program’s inception, to roughly 6% currently.43 Furthermore, 
while the tax cap covered about 92% of taxable earnings in 1937, that number 
has decreased, and it now only covers about 82% of such earnings.44 The 
increase in the number of workers above the tax cap and the recession in 
covered earnings is due to the fact that wages have remained stagnant over 
the last decade for middle and low-income earners, but have significantly 
increased for high-income earners.45 
If the cap was raised or eliminated, policymakers would need to decide 
how to account for any new taxed earnings. Three options exist: the first is 
                                                                                                                           
 
approach of the Social Security Program by providing a larger percentage of benefits to lower income 
citizens. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-16-75SP, SOCIAL SECURITY’S FUTURE: 
ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS 9–11 (Oct. 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673385.pdf [hereinafter 
SOCIAL SECURITY’S FUTURE]. 
39 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
40 See generally Hosansky, supra note 1. 
41 Kathleen Romig, Increasing Payroll Taxes Would Strengthen Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET 
AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 7 (Sept. 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-27-16socsec 
.pdf. 
42 Id. Because income in excess of the payroll tax cap is exempt from taxation, workers with such 
income are not taxed on the same proportion of their earnings as workers who do not have income that 
exceeds the cap. 
43 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 10. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. See also Raising the Social Security Tax Cap, NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SEC. & 
MEDICARE (2016), http://www.ncpssm.org/PublicPolicy/SocialSecurity/Documents/ArticleID/1466/ 
Raising-the-Social-Security-Tax-Cap. 
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to keep the same formula, providing workers benefits on their newly taxed 
earnings; the second is to maintain the current benefit formula, only 
providing benefits up to the current tax cap and not on newly taxed earnings; 
and the third is a middle ground that includes increasing benefits for those 
paying higher taxes but by lesser amounts than the current formula 
mandates.46 
1. Increasing (But Not Eliminating) the Payroll Tax Cap 
Increasing the cap to once again cover 90% of workers’ earnings would 
set it at about $270,000—more than double the current cap.47 Specifically, if 
the cap was increased to cover 90% of earnings while also providing workers 
increased benefits up to the revised taxable maximum, 27% of the Program’s 
shortfall over the Trustee’s 75 year projection period would be eliminated, 
while its balance over that 75 year period would increase by 17%.48 Doing 
the same while not providing increased benefits on the revised taxable 
maximum would eliminate about 35% of the projected financial shortfall, 
while increasing the annual balance by 27.83%.49 
2. Eliminating the Payroll Tax Cap 
Eliminating the cap immediately, or phasing it out gradually, would 
drastically decrease the projected financial shortfall while restoring the Trust 
Funds’ balance. For example, eliminating the cap immediately while 
providing benefit credits for earnings above the current cap would eliminate 
67% of the projected shortfall while increasing the annual balance by 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 See Romig, supra note 41, at 9; Citizens for Tax Justice, An Analysis of Eliminating the Cap on 
Earnings Subject to the Social Security Tax & Related Issues 3 (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.ctj.org/ 
pdf/socialsecuritytaxearningscapnov2006.pdf; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ACTUARIAL PUBLICATIONS, 
PROVISIONS AFFECTING PAYROLL TAXES (2018), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/ 
payrolltax.html. 
47 Romig, supra note 41, at 7. 
48 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ACTUARIAL PUBLICATIONS, PROPOSED PROVISION E3.1 (2018) (The 
Program’s annual balance would increase from -3% to +14%), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/ 
provisions/charts/chart_run232.html. 
49 Id. at E3.2 (The Program’s annual balance would increase from negative -2.83% to +25%), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run215.html. 
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38.83%.50 Eliminating the cap immediately and not extending benefits above 
the current cap would eliminate 83% of the projected financial shortfall, 
while increasing the annual balance by 57.83%.51 
C. Disadvantages of Increasing or Eliminating the Payroll Tax Cap 
While raising or eliminating the cap may resolve the Program’s 
projected financial shortfall, such a reform measure comes with potentially 
negative economic consequences. Raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap 
could increase costs, harm individual incomes, and stunt economic growth 
while also frustrating the purpose of the Program.52 
1. The Purpose of the Program Would be Frustrated 
As a Social Security Administration report provided, “The upper limit 
on the tax was designed to assure that no one contributed directly more than 
the value of the protection that he or she received.”53 In fact, the creators of 
the Program did not advocate for a tax cap, but instead recommended that 
people with earnings exceeding three times the average wage be exempt 
altogether from the Program—neither paying taxes nor receiving benefits.54 
“This recommendation was likely rooted in [the Program’s] original intent to 
prevent poverty in old age.”55 Moreover, “persons who [did] earn more than 
three times the national average are unlikely to need government provided 
insurance to remain out of poverty during retirement.”56 However, by 
eliminating the cap, “a person earning $225,000 would pay roughly four 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Id. at E2.2 (The Program’s annual balance would increase from -2.83% to +36%), https:// 
www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run193.html. 
51 Id. at E2.1 (The Program’s annual balance would increase from -2.83% to +57%), https:// 
www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run181.html. 
52 Rachel Greszler, Raising the Social Security Payroll Tax Cap: Solving Nothing, Harming Much, 
THE HERITAGE FOUND. 1 (Aug. 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2923.pdf. 
53 MICHAEL RESNICK, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL EARNINGS AND THE TAXABLE MAXIMUM FOR 
OASDI 38 (Nov. 1966), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v29n11/v29n11p38.pdf. 
54 Greszler, supra note 52, at 2. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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times more in taxes than [he would] receive in benefits,”57 thus steering the 
Program towards becoming a “welfare program.” 
Furthermore, while proponents of raising or eliminating the cap point to 
the decrease in taxable wages, opponents argue that coverage has fallen (from 
90% to about 83%). Specifically, (1) the 83% rate has been the average rate 
of coverage during the duration of the Program,58 and (2) the falling coverage 
is due to the increase of health costs.59 
 
 60 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Andrew G. Biggs, Don’t Raise or Eliminate the Cap, AM. ENTER. INST. (Apr. 18, 2013), http:// 
www.aei.org/publication/dont-raise-or-eliminate-the-cap/. 
58 Id. See also Andrew G. Biggs, Eight Reasons We Shouldn’t Raise the Cap on Social Security 
Taxes, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/02/eight-reasons-we-
shouldnt-raise-cap-social-security-taxes-andrew-biggs/, stating: 
Social Security didn’t start in 1983. And over the program’s entire history, an average of 
just 84% of wages have been taxed, practically equal to today’s 83%. In fact, from 1950 
through 1972, upward of 20% of total earnings generally weren’t taxed by Social Security. 
From the CAP authors’ perspective, the Social Security tax base was more inequitable 
during those two decades than it is today. 
59 Id. 
60 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 10. 
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2. An Increase in the Marginal Tax Rate Would Result in Negative 
Economic Affects 
Raising or eliminating the cap would cause a substantial increase to the 
tax rates of high-income earners.61 Today’s top marginal tax rate on earned 
income is 37%.62 Adding state income tax drives that number even higher—
into the mid-40% range for most states, and 50% for California.63 Eliminating 
the tax cap effectively raises the top tax rate by 6 percentage points. For 
example, if the cap was eliminated, a single person with $150,000 in taxable 
income would see his or her combined federal income and payroll tax rate 
jump from 24% to 30.2%, and would pay an additional $13,392 in taxes.64 
Because taxes are distortionary,65 meaning that they alter individuals’ 
behavior and total economic output, a raise in the marginal tax rate could 
discourage work by the most productive workers.66 This would result in less 
payroll revenue than anticipated.67 When marginal tax rates rise, lower-
income workers are constrained in their ability to cut back on work due to 
the fact that they must maintain some minimal level of income.68 In contrast, 
higher-income workers generally have more flexibility to work less.69 
However, working less leads to a reduction of take-home pay, which tends 
to result in cuts on savings and investment.70 The disincentive to work results 
in lower incomes and less investment, which ultimately would harm 
economic growth and negatively affect tax revenues.71 
In conclusion, while raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap would 
mitigate the projected economic shortfall, an increase in taxes on high-wage 
earners may lead to a decreased work incentive, which in turn would 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 Why the Social Security Tax Cap Shouldn’t Be Raised, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Jan. 1, 2005), 
https://fee.org/articles/why-the-social-security-tax-cap-shouldnt-be-raised/. 
62 Amir El-Sibaie, 2018 Tax Brackets, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/2018-
tax-brackets/. 
63 Morgan Scarboro, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2018, TAX FOUND. 
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/. 
64 2018 tax rates were used for this calculation. 
65 Greszler, supra note 52, at 4. 
66 Why the Social Security Tax Cap Shouldn’t Be Raised, supra note 61. 
67 See generally Greszler, supra note 52, at 1. 
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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negatively affect economic output and tax revenue. Therefore, when deciding 
whether to increase or eliminate the payroll tax cap, policymakers must 
weigh the costs and benefits of the economic effects. 
III. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CUTTING BENEFITS BY RAISING THE 
RETIREMENT AGE 
A. Overview of the Retirement Age 
The Program provides monthly benefits72 based on an employee’s 
earnings history.73 To receive such benefits, a worker must have worked in 
“covered” employment for at least 40 calendar quarters (known as “quarters 
of coverage”),74 and the total earnings must meet a required minimum, which 
is adjusted annually for inflation.75 If the aforementioned requirements are 
met, a worker is entitled to an unreduced benefit at “normal retirement age” 
(NRA) equal to his or her primary insurance amount (PIA). The PIA is 
progressive, providing a larger benefit as a percentage of earnings to lower 
earners than to higher earners.76 
The NRA, which has gradually increased since the Program’s creation, 
is based on a worker’s year of birth.77 A worker also has the option to elect 
for early retirement beginning at age 62 at the cost of permanently reduced 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 See SOCIAL SECURITY’S FUTURE, supra note 38, at 8–11 (There are three steps to determine the 
amount of benefits a worker will receive. First, the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), which are 
indexed to changes in average wages, are calculated based on the worker’s highest thirty-five earning 
years in which he or she paid Social Security taxes (known as computation years). Second, the AIME is 
used in a progressive formula to calculate the PIA, which is the benefit received if claimed at the full 
retirement age. Third, adjustments are made to the PIA to reflect various other provisions, such as those 
relating to early or delayed retirement, maximum family benefit amounts, and receipt of a non-covered 
pension. Id. Additionally, once monthly payments have begun, benefits are generally adjusted to reflect 
price inflation, known as cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA)). 
73 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 281 (6th ed. 2014). 
74 Id. at 283. 
75 Id. at 284. 
76 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT (2018) (in 2018, the PIA is derived via the 
following calculation: 90% of the first $895 of AIME + 32% of AIME over $895 through $5,397 + 15% 
of AIME over $5,397). 
77 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RETIREMENT AGE: BACKGROUND, https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/ 
background.html (last accessed Mar. 2018). 
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monthly benefits.78 Finally, a worker may elect to defer retirement beyond 
the NRA up to age 70, in which case the retiree receives a bonus in the form 
of “delayed retirement credits.”79 
 
80 
B. Advantages of Raising the Retirement Age 
The increase of the average life expectancy and the retirement of the 
baby-boom generation have led to more benefits being paid to beneficiaries 
for longer periods of time.81 Increasing the retirement age by raising the 
NRA, ERA, or a combination of both would help reduce the Program’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 73, at 291 (providing that “[t]he amount of the reduction is five 
ninths of 1 percent  per month for the first 36 months plus 5/12 of 1 percent for each additional month 
thereafter”). 
79 Id. at 292. 
80 Understanding Social Security, REINVENTING RETIREMENT, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
reinventretirement/0,5764,7-332-69371_69423-337704--,00.html (last accessed Mar. 2018). 
81 See generally TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
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projected financial shortfall, while also increasing work productivity, which 
benefits both individuals and the economy as a whole.82 Furthermore, it 
would bring the post-retirement life expectancy gap closer to what it was 
when the Program was enacted.83 
1. Increasing the Retirement Age Will Reduce the Projected Shortfall 
Increasing the retirement age would help reduce the Program’s 
projected economic shortfall, which is demonstrated by a series of policy 
proposals that would raise the NRA, ERA, or a combination of both. For 
example, a proposal that advocates solely for an increase in the NRA suggests 
raising the NRA one month every two years until it reaches 68, with the 
increase beginning after the NRA reaches 67 for people age 62 in 2022.84 If 
this policy were implemented, it would eliminate 13% of the projected 
financial shortfall and would create an annual balance of 16% by year 75.85 
Conversely, a proposal advocating for only raising the ERA, suggests 
increasing the ERA by two months per year for people age 62, beginning in 
2019 and ending in 2036, so that the ERA would reach 65 for people age 62 
in 2036.86 While not eliminating the same amount of shortfall as the proposal 
increasing the NRA, this proposal would still eliminate 0.83% of the 
shortfall.87 
Finally, a proposal that advocates for increasing both the NRA and ERA 
would eliminate 29% of the projected shortfall and would create an annual 
balance of 26% by year 75.88 Under this proposal, the NRA and ERA would 
rise for people age 62 starting in 2018, by 3 months per year, until the REA 
reaches 64 in 2025 and the NRA reaches 69 in 2029.89 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 See supra Part I.B. (explaining that the post-retirement life expectancy was 14 years at one point 
in time). 
83 See infra Part II.B. 
84 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ACTUARIAL PUBLICATIONS, PROPOSED PROVISION C1.1 (2018), https:// 
www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run104.html. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at C2.1, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run144.html. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at C2.7, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/charts/chart_run164.html. 
89 Id. 
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2. Increasing the Retirement Age Will Benefit the Economy 
Increasing the retirement age will benefit both individuals and the 
economy by incentivizing workers to remain in the labor force longer.90 The 
longer a person waits to retire, the wealthier and more financially secure that 
person will become. For example, a worker who works 8 extra years between 
ages 62 and 70, which is a 20% increase in working years for a person who 
began working at age 22, will increase his or her Social Security payouts by 
76% per year.91 In other words, 20% more work yields a 76% increase in 
benefits.92 Working until age 70 would also likely double 401(k) benefits.93 
The combined increase in both Social Security and 401(k) benefits would 
lead to a substantial income increase per year.94 This significantly reduces a 
retiree’s chance of sinking into poverty at an early age. Moreover, it increases 
economic output and raises the standard of living for both active and retired 
workers.95 
In conclusion, while increasing the retirement age would not completely 
eliminate the projected financial shortfall, it would help reduce it. By doing 
so, elderly people would have an incentive to work longer. Therefore, fewer 
taxes would need to be paid by taxpayers to support the elderly, and the 
overall economy would expand due to increased productivity. Furthermore, 
raising the retirement age would decrease the post retirement life expectancy 
gap so that it is closer to what it was when the Program was enacted. 
C. Disadvantages of Raising the Retirement Age 
While raising the retirement age in some form would reduce the 
Program’s economic short-fall, such a reform measure places economic 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RAISE THE FULL RETIREMENT AGE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2016/52186. 
91 Charles D. Ellis, Ph.D., Work Longer, Retire Richer (Dec. 9 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2014/12/09/work-longer-retire-richer-research-reveals.html. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Gordon B.T. Mermin & C. Eugene Steuerle, Would Raising the Social Security Retirement Age 
Harm Low-Income Groups?, URBAN INST. 1 (2006). 
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burden on low-income earners,96 and the U.S. economy as a whole. It also 
frustrates the purpose of the Program. Furthermore, costs might merely shift 
from the OASI Program to the DI Program, thus, ultimately not solving the 
impending financial shortfall. 
1. Raising the Retirement Age Would Harm Low-Income Workers 
Increasing the retirement age results in lower-income earners, who need 
benefits the most, collecting benefits for a shorter period of time than higher-
income earners. While the average life expectancy has increased, longevity 
differences exist between socioeconomic classes.97 A recent study shows that 
in the United States, the richest 1% of men live an average of 14.6 years 
longer than the poorest 1% of men, while amongst women with those same 
wealth percentiles, the difference is 10.1 years, on average.98 This gap is 
rapidly growing. Over the past 15 years, life expectancy has increased by 
2.34 years for men and 2.91 years for women who are among the top 5% of 
income earners in the United States, but it has increased by just 0.32% and 
0.04% for men and women respectively in the bottom 5% of income 
earners.99 
These numbers are more drastic when broken down by race. In 2015, 
18.4% of African American elderly people lived below the poverty line.100 
Furthermore, about 45% of elderly African Americans rely on the Program’s 
benefits for more than 90% of their income.101 This compares to only 32% of 
white people.102 Reducing benefits by raising the retirement age would 
negatively affect the elderly poor by cutting into their retirement income.103 
                                                                                                                           
 
96 Jordan Yadoo, Raising Retirement Age Disproportionately Hurts Poor, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-11/raising-retirement-age-disproportionately-
hurts-poor. 
97 Peter Dizikes, New study shows rich, poor have huge mortality gap in U.S., MIT NEWS (Apr. 
2016), http://news.mit.edu/2016/study-rich-poor-huge-mortality-gap-us-0411. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 9. 
101 Top Ten Facts on Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 7–8 (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-8-16socsec.pdf. 
102 Id. 
103 See generally Elvis Guzman & Nakia Gladden, Why Raising the Retirement Age Would Hurt 
African Americans, CTR. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y SOLUTIONS (July 2015). 
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This would ultimately affect their children and families, which would 
negatively impact the U.S. economy. 
2. Raising the Retirement Age Would Shift Costs to the DI Program 
Another disadvantage of raising the retirement age is that it would 
incentivize older workers who are nearing retirement, but who have not yet 
reached the mandated retirement age, to stop working and apply for DI 
benefits.104 A person receiving disability benefits under the DI program is 
automatically transferred to the OASI program once that person reaches the 
full retirement age.105 Before 2003, no individual over age 65 received DI 
benefits because upon turning 65, they would have been transferred to the 
OASI Program.106 However, the FRA is currently 66 and is scheduled to rise 
to 67 (for people who were born in 1960 and later).107 The increase of the 
FRA means that people can remain on the DI Program for an additional year 
(and soon to be 2) before rolling over to the OASI Program.108 Moreover, 
because the number of DI beneficiaries rises with age, more older workers 
will apply for the DI Program at age 65.109 “To eliminate the added incentive 
to apply for disability benefits, policymakers could narrow the difference by 
also reducing scheduled disability benefits.”110 However, this would further 
burden low-income earners and would cause negative impacts on the 
economy. 
                                                                                                                           
 
104 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 90. 
105 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOC. SEC. DISABILITY INSURANCE 
PROGRAM 2016, at 2 (Oct. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2016/di_asr16.pdf. 
[hereinafter DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM]. 
106 Nick Buffie, Raising the Retirement Age Has Increased the Costs of the Disability Program, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH (Oct. 30, 2015), http://cepr.net/blogs/cepr-blog/raising-the-
retirement-age-has-increased-the-costs-of-the-disability-program. 
107 Buffie, supra note 106. 
108 DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, supra note 105, at 1. 
109 Id. 
110 RAISE THE FULL RETIREMENT AGE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 90. 
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 111 
IV. SOCIAL SECURITY’S BENEFIT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 
A. Overview of the Program’s Economic Effect 
The Program, which provides the foundation of retirement and disability 
income for almost all Americans,112 has a major impact on the U.S. economy. 
At the end of 2016, the OASDI Program provided benefits to about 61 
million people.113 “Benefits were paid to 44 million retired workers and 
dependents of retired workers, 6 million survivors of deceased workers, and 
11 million disabled workers and dependents of disabled workers.”114 
The average monthly benefit paid to beneficiaries equated to $1,360 
under the OASI Program, and $1,172 under the DI Program.115 Of last year’s 
benefit recipients, about 50% of elderly beneficiary couples relied on the 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 Chart Book: Social Security Disability Insurance, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 4 
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-21-14socsec-chartbook.pdf. 
112 Elisa A. Walker, Virginia P. Reno & Thomas N. Bethell, Americans Make Hard Choices on 
Social Security: Report Highlights, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SOC. INS. 1 (2014), https://www.nasi.org/sites/ 
default/files/research/HIGHLIGHTS_Americans_Make_Hard_Choices_on_SS.pdf. 
113 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
114 Id. 
115 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: SOC. SEC. 1 (2017). 
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Program’s benefits for more than half of their income, while this number 
increased to 71% for elderly, nonmarried beneficiaries.116 Moreover, one-
third of elderly beneficiaries relied on the Program’s benefits for 90% or 
more of their income.117 
 
 118 
The benefits paid to millions of recipients positively affect the economy 
by reducing the poverty rate and increasing economic output.119 Therefore, 
lawmakers must consider the impact of any proposed reforms on not only 
specific classes of individuals, but on the U.S. economy as a whole. 
B. The Social Security Program Reduces Poverty 
The Program plays a vital role in reducing poverty throughout the 
United States, which positively affects the economy. It does so by reducing 
money that stems from supporting the needy and by increasing economic 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 8. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Kathleen Romig & Arloc Sherman, Social Security Keeps 22 Million Americans Out of Poverty: 
A State-By-State Analysis 1 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-25-13ss.pdf. 
See also Hosansky, supra note 1, at 1. 
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output.120 Since 1959, poverty rates have dropped by more than two-thirds 
for people age sixty-five and older,121 and without benefits, a study found that 
22.1 million more Americans would have income below the poverty line.122 
1. The Program Mitigates the Percentage of Elderly Poverty 
People age 65 and older rely heavily on the Program’s benefits. Benefits 
constituted at least 50% of total income for 50% of elderly beneficiary 
couples and 71% of elder nonmarried beneficiaries.123 Benefits constituted 
90% or more of income for 23% of elderly beneficiary couples and 43% of 
elderly nonmarried beneficiaries.124 
Without the Program’s benefits, 40.5% of the elderly would have 
income below the poverty line.125 However, due to the Program’s existence, 
that number currently lies at only 8.8%, with benefits lifting roughly 15.1 
million elderly above the poverty line.126 
2. The Program Benefits Children and Their Families 
The Program’s benefits also protect children and their families.127 In 
2015, about 9%, or 6.5 million, of children age 18 and under lived in families 
that received income from the Program, and it is projected that benefits lifts 
about 1.1 million children out of poverty each year.128 
In 2016, 3.1 million children age 18 and under qualified for benefits 
themselves.129 Of those children, 1.2 million received payments due to being 
the child of a deceased worker,130 1.5 million received payments due to a 
                                                                                                                           
 
120 See generally Koenig & Myles, supra note 5. 
121 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FIGURE FIVE: POVERTY RATES BY AGE: 1959 TO 2016, https://  
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2017/demo/p60-259/figure5.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 2018). 
122 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. 
123 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 8. 
124 Id. 
125 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. See also FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 23. 
130 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. See also FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 23. 
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parent or parents being disabled,131 and 353 received payments due to a 
parent or guardian being retired.132 
Children who grow up in poverty are more likely to have low earnings 
as adults, which ultimately results in lower workforce productivity and 
economic output.133 Thus, the Program helps mitigate such negative 
economic effects. 
3. The Program Benefits Elderly Women and Minority Families 
The Program’s benefits are especially important for elderly women and 
minorities, who on average have lower lifetime earnings than elderly men 
and non-minority families.134 This is demonstrated by the fact that 
nonmarried women and minorities had the highest poverty rates as of 2015, 
ranging from 15.3% to 18.4%.135 
Because women, on average, earn less than men during their careers and 
take more time out of the paid workforce, they generally have less lifetime 
savings and smaller pensions than men.136 Moreover, women have a higher 
life expectancy and thus, tend to outlive their spouses, which leads to 
increasing impoverishment as they age.137 However, due to the Program’s 
benefits, in 2015, 8.9 million elderly women were lifted out of poverty.138 
Finally, without benefits, the poverty rate for elderly Latinos and 
African Americans would be 44.7% and 50.6%, respectively.139 However, 
because of the Program’s benefits, that number is reduced to roughly 18.2% 
for African Americans and 17.5% for Latinos.140 
                                                                                                                           
 
131 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. See also FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 23. 
132 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 23. 
133 Harry J. Holzer, Diane W. Schanzenbach, Greg J. Duncan & Jens Ludwig, The Economic Costs 
of Poverty in the U.S.: Subsequent Effects of Children Growing Up Poor, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 
(2007), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/01/pdf/poverty_report.pdf. 
134 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 2; see also id. 
135 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 9. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 2. 
139 FAST FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 26, at 9. 
140 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 2. 
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 141 
4. By Reducing Poverty, the Program Positively Benefits the National 
Economy 
The Program’s reduction of the poverty rate helps alleviate costs that 
poverty inflicts on society.142 The economic costs of poverty to society 
include public expenditures on poor families, especially for conditions and 
behaviors such as poor health and crime that are associated with poverty.143 
According to a report conducted by the University of California, Berkeley, 
Center for Labor Research and Education, low-wage earners cost taxpayers 
approximately $153 billion every year in public support.144 By reducing the 
number of people below the poverty line, the Program ultimately helps 
mitigate the amount of public expenditures needed to support impoverished 
persons. 
                                                                                                                           
 
141 Id. 
142 See generally Koenig & Myles, supra note 5. 
143 Holzer et al., supra note 133, at 3. 
144 Public Affairs, UC Berkley, Poverty-level wages cost U.S. taxpayers $153 billion every year, 
BERKLEY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015), http://news.berkeley.edu/2015/04/13/poverty-level-wages-cost-u-s-
taxpayers/. 
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 145 
C. Social Security Enhances Economic Growth 
By reducing the poverty rate and supplying income in the form of 
monthly benefits to millions of workers, the Program increases economic 
output and acts as an automatic stabilizer.146 Specifically, benefit spending 
directly results in the employment of millions of Americans,147 and thousands 
of businesses of all sizes exist in whole or in part because of the Program’s 
effect on the economy.148 Specifically, a study found that benefits contributed 
                                                                                                                           
 
145 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. 
146 See generally Hosansky, supra note 1. See also Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., URBAN INST. 
AND BROOKINGS INST., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-automatic-stabilizers-
and-how-do-they-work (“Automatic stabilizers are features of the tax and transfer systems that temper the 
economy when it overheats and provide economic stimulus when the economy slumps, without direct 
intervention by policymakers.”). 
147 Koenig & Myles, supra note 5, at 1. 
148 Id. 
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roughly $1.6 trillion to the U.S. economy,149 supported more than 9 million 
jobs,150 and accounted for 1 out of every 20 jobs.151 
The Program’s benefits increase economic output by affecting 
beneficiaries’ marginal propensity to consume (MPC),152 thereby increasing 
the multiplier effect,153 which ultimately results in a higher real gross 
domestic product.154 Economic output is increased when beneficiaries spend 
their monthly checks on goods and services, thereby injecting money into the 
economy.155 The money spent goes to the producer of those goods and 
services, who in turn uses the money to pay employees and buy more goods 
from suppliers to sell to future customers—therefore adding more money to 
the flow.156 In sum, the extra income generated from the Program’s benefits 
leads to extra demands and spending, which ultimately creates more 
income.157 This increase in income due to the new injection of spending is 
the multiplier effect. A study found that for every one dollar in Social 
Security benefits paid, almost two dollars of spending in the United States. 
occurred, which led to the increase of real GDP and hence economic 
output.158 
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES 
The Program immensely benefits the U.S. economy. Therefore, 
lawmakers must carefully weigh the costs and benefits when deciding which 
                                                                                                                           
 
149 Peter S. Arno & Andrew R. Maroko, Soc. Sec. Spotlight: Economic Impact of Social Security, 
NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE. SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE FOUND. 4 (2016), http://socialsecurityspotlight.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/report-low-res.pdf. 
150 Romig & Sherman, supra note 119, at 1. 
151 Id. 
152 Marginal propensity to consume is a person’s tendency to spend from a source of income. See 
Koenig & Myles supra note 5, at 7. 
153 The multiplier effect refers to the increase in income arising from any new injections of 
spending. Regarding Social Security, the multiplier is the ratio of the total impact on the economy to the 
amount of the original Social Security benefit payments. For example, if the original amount of benefits 
paid by the Social Security Program was $1 billion, and the total amount of spending caused by the 
benefits was $2 billion, then the multiplier effect would be 2 because each dollar of benefits paid resulted 
in $2 of output. See id. 
154 Real gross domestic product is the inflation adjusted value of economic output. See FED. 
RESERVE ECON. DATA, REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1. 
155 Koenig & Myles, supra note 5, at 7. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 12. 
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policy measure(s) to implement in order to remedy the Program’s projected 
financial shortfall. While raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap would 
impose no benefit reductions to the lower class, therefore preventing an 
increase in the poverty rate, it would likely disincentivize the most skilled 
and productive people from working, which would lead to lower savings and 
investment and thus lower economic growth. 
In contrast, reducing benefits by raising the retirement age would reduce 
the projected financial shortfall and would increase economic output by 
incentivizing individuals to work longer. However, due to the disparity of 
average life expectancy between high income earners and low-income 
earners, low-income earners would receive benefits for shorter periods of 
time, which could force more people below the poverty rate. This would 
harm the U.S. economy by increasing taxes associated with poverty. 
In order to decrease the projected financial shortfall without 
detrimentally harming individuals, and ultimately the economy, the best 
solution would be to enact a combination of reform measures that includes 
both decreasing benefits and raising taxes. For example, the Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s Commission on Retirement Security and Personal Savings proposes 
a 12-step plan that eliminates Social Security’s projected financial 
shortfall.159 Of those 12 steps, 1 step includes increasing the payroll tax while 
also increasing benefits to go along with it, and the other step includes 
increasing the full retirement age to 69 over a gradual period of time.160 The 
use of this reform measure would ensure that the Program remains solvent 
for at least 75 years and would guarantee that it would have the ability to pay 
100% of scheduled benefits on a timely basis for the foreseeable future.161 
The only issue with such a provision is the fact that lawmakers would need 
to set aside their political differences in order to benefit the U.S. economy. 
Whether or not this could actually happen remains to be seen. 
                                                                                                                           
 
159 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROPOSALS AFFECTING TRUST FUND SOLVENCY, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. 
COMM. ON RETIREMENT SEC. AND PERSONAL SAVINGS (June 9, 2016), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ 
solvency/BPC_20160609.pdf. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In order to prevent the Program’s Trust Funds from becoming insolvent, 
immediate reform is necessary. However, since reform continues to be a 
political hot topic, lawmakers have shied away from taking action. While 
debating which reform measures best suit remedying the projected financial 
shortfall, policymakers must give weight to the Program’s effect on the U.S. 
economy and the impact of the varying reforms. They must keep in mind that 
the Program provides benefits to millions of people in need and enhances 
economic growth. Therefore, lawmakers should choose a package of reform 
measures that would mitigate negative economic benefits on certain classes 
of individuals in order to not negatively impact the U.S. economy. 
